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Legal Theory and Epistemic Values:  
Against Authoritarian Interpretivism 
 
Abstract: In his new book, R. Dworkin advocates the unity of values thesis. He wants to circumscribe 
morality as a proper epistemological domain which is methodologically different from scientific inquiry. 
The  epistemological  independence  of  morality  is  supposed  to  be  a  consequence  of  the  irreducible 
fact/value dichotomy. This paper sustains that unity of values thesis is methodologically correct; all moral 
reasoning must be a constructive interpretation of its meaning. However, that author fails to recognize 
that  not  every  axiological  interpretation  implies  moral  consequences.  From  H.  Putnam’s  pragmatic 
realism, this paper intends to demonstrate that much of scientific inquiry relies on values interpretation, 
and that this kind of reasoning is morally neutral. Finally, it should be clear that epistemological choices 
in legal positivism – e.g. the decision on which aspects of social interaction are theoretically relevant – 
should not disturb the soundness of its argument nor should it be read as if it had moral implications. This 
paper concludes that positivist theories cannot be ruled out. Since the choice between descriptive and 
interpretative  models  requires  a  circular  justification,  legal  theory  is  itself  an  activity  governed  by 
epistemic values interpretation. Likewise natural sciences, it can only be understood from an internal 
perspective.  Accordingly,  inclusive  positivism  holds  the  advantage  of  being  more  consilient  than 
interpretivism, which is arguably parochial. 
Keywords:  Legal  Theory,  Ronald  Dworkin,  Hilary  Putnam,  Interpretativism,  Pragmatic  Realism, 
Epistemic Values, Interpretive Concepts. 
 
II. Introduction 
Ronald  Dworkin  is  presently  one  of  the  leading  anglophone  legal  theorist.  His  writings, 
especially at the constitutional law field, has had a remarkable influence on the legal thinking, in 
Brazil and worldwide. Dworkin’s new book, Justice for Hedgehogs, is bound to draw a great deal 
of attention to itself. One of its noteworthy features is its deep philosophical concerns. The author 
takes pains to answer to several of his critics in a wide range of topics. One important aspect of 
the book is the lengthy exhibition of his controversy against the positivist conception of law. For 
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the first time, since his Law’s Empire, Dworkin presents his argument in its full length. This 
alone suffices to make its publication a major event in recent legal theory.  
The present article aims at a small, albeit relevant topic in Justice for Hedgehogs. It is meant 
to present and discuss, through criticisms made from a neopragmatic approach, Dworkin’s thesis 
on the nature of legal theory and philosophy of law. Inspiring as it is, the book is very polemic in 
some subjects. One of his fundamental proposition is the long-debated “Hume’s principle”. It 
states that fact and value constitute irreducibly different aspects of experience. Form this thesis, 
and some other important premises, the author concludes that the positivistic conceptual analysis 
of law is untenable. Since law is a value concept, he argues, it cannot be subjected to a strictly 
neutral  conceptual  analysis.  On  the  contrary,  its  meaning  should  be  articulated  in  a 
comprehensive moral theory. 
Briefly, this paper aims to show that Dworkin is short on evidence of this methodological 
implication of the Hume’s principle. Surely he may show that a normative concept of law have to 
be subject to an interpretive enterprise. But he fails to prove that there cannot be a neutral, strictly 
descriptive concept of law.  
 
II. Dworkin’s Stance in the Legal Theory Debate 
Dworkin made his name as a public intellectual with a series of attacks on the prevailing legal 
theory in the Anglo-Saxon world. His preferred target was, not surprisingly, the greatest English 
language philosopher of the twentieth century, Herbert Hart. Dworkin’s criticisms of the British 
professor’s positivist model cover a great number of subjects. Some of them in fact led Hart to 
reconsider relevant aspects of his writings. But one of them continued being a matter of debates 
for decades, and Justice for Hedgehogs is certainly destined to renew this discussion. The theme 
in question is the nature of theory and philosophy of law. 
Dworkin denies that Hart is capable of doing justice to the essence of the idea of law when 
explaining the concept of law as a simple fact
3.  No concept of law that is seen from an external 
perspective, such as the Hart’s proposal of a descriptive theory – at least as Dworkin describes it 
–,  could  explain  in  which  way  the  disputes  over  the  meaning  of  Law  are  themselves  its 
constituents. Legal theories as a simple fact fail, the author states, by not taking into account the 
role of moral considerations in the legal argument, by adopting criterial semantics of legal terms 
and, consequently, by adopting a supposedly external and neutral perspective for analysis. 
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Law is not a simple social fact and any concept of jurisprudential interest – and not merely 
sociological or historical interest – must account for its character value. A merely descriptive 
conception  makes  the  mistake  of  confusing  criterial  concepts  with  interpretive  concepts
4. 
Political concepts such as law have value, are oriented to fulfill a certain finality . Theorizing 
about particular value is to give it meaning, supplying an interpretation of what it is and what it 
requires
5. This is the constructive interpretation that Dworkin defends as the valid method for 
legal thought. 
Dworkin defended in one of his arguments – the semantic sting argument – that a discipline 
dedicated to social practices cannot offer a neutral description of its object. Looking at the history 
of his own theory of law, he admits having presented a flawed concept of law in his first works. 
At the time, he understood law and morality as different systems and that the task of the theory of 
law is to measure the degree of entanglement between them
6. Since then, especially after the 
publication of his book Law’s Empire, the concept of Law began to be characterized by Dworkin 
as a deeply contested concept, such as political or moral ones. What makes them so intrinsically 
contentious is the fact that they depend on a teleological perspective, on values that give them 
meaning
7. Justice for Hedgehogs innovates by sustaining that, given the unity of value, there 
cannot  be  a  clear  distinction  between  law  and  morals.  Both  are  part  of  the  same  type  of 
intellectual activity and differ themselves only by the purpose they serve
8. 
Consistently, Law does no t have a deep structure that can be discovered by empirical 
investigation. The divergence of legal practitioners concerning their fundamental propositions 
indicates that Law is not a mere conventional concept. Hence, there aren’t defined usage criteria 
that can be clarified by theory. What  exist are irreducibly different  conceptions of Law that 
reconstruct the legal practice holding a different set of elements as essential. The interpretive 
reconstruction of Law depends on the value that is attributed to it in each different conception. 
Given the idea of an integrated epistemology – which results from Hume’s principle –, part of 
Dworkin’s moral philosophy, conceptual analysis that incorporate value is not different from the 
justification of substantive legal doctrines. Thus, it is not possible to propose a legal theory that is 
neutral in relation to its object. The criteria that guide the theorist to privilege some elements of 
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the practice over others are evaluative and have the same nature as the criteria that lead the judge 
to support a certain concept of existing law. 
 
III. The role of interpretation in Dworkin 
In  Dworkin’s  writings,  the  idea  of  interpretation  has  a  much  larger  role  than  acquisition  of 
meaning from texts or the reconstruction of the judicial activity. It is also the sole valid method 
for the analysis of the concept of law. To understand this surprising affirmation it is important to 
take into account his most recent arguments in moral philosophy. 
Since Law’s Empire, Dworkin’s theory of law gets outlined as what came to be known as 
interpretivism – the model according to which the fact that makes legal propositions true or false 
is  interpretive.  Since  then,  the  source  of  Law’s  normativity  is  its  own  justification.  This  is 
because ever since he started to abandon the two systems notion, Dworkin could offer a theory of 
public  morality  as  a  source  of  normativity  as  an  alternative  to  the  identification  of  specific 
authorities’ decisions, which are merely political facts. 
In fact, Dworkin’s new book is largely dedicated to clarifying and defending specific aspects 
of  his  theory  of  morality,  such  as  the  idea  of  interpretive  concepts  and  the  idea  of  moral 
responsibility, which are indispensable for his conception of legal theory. Thus, by expanding 
interpretivism  to  the  level  of  a  theory  of  normative  discourse  in  general,  Dworkin  can 
demonstrate that his conception of law stems from a comprehensive moral theory
9.  
In this way, Dworkin’s statement that the conception of Law is interpretive, just like other 
political conceptions, makes complete sense. Since the truth of first-order legal propositions is 
determined by fundamental propositions of the legal system
10, the latter are secure parameters for 
the identification of the most adequate legal solution in  each case. However, because of the 
interpretive character of law, the fundamental propositions are profoundly disputed. The essential 
attributes of the practice of law are subject to the reconstruction operated by the interpretive 
activity
11. In spite of recognizing that certain political facts – like judicial or legislative decisions 
– are consensually relevant in the identification of law, interpretivism states that what makes 
them legally relevant is the normative fact that that is the best theoretical reconstruction of the 
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legal practice
12. Easy and hard cases, relative to specific questions or to the foundations of Law, 
are all subject to criticism. So, every legal proposition should be coherent with a theory – explicit 
or implicit – that potentially covers the totality of Law, understood as a specific legal order or as 
a generic concept
13.  
One  can  conclude that  jurisprudence  is  methodologically  related  to  moral  philosophy. 
Considering  that  interpretation  can  only  take  place  within  the amply  accepted inte rpretive 
genres
14, the problem of the limits between morals and law – if they should be postulated or not – 
can  only  be  resolved  from  the  perspective  of  one  of  the  two  normative  systems,  by  the 
assumption of either a moral or a legal point of view
15.  
 
IV. Normative and Neutral Concepts in Science and in Legal Theory 
The disagreement over the concept of Law is indeed a nontrivial divergence and certainly is the 
product of a form of value assignment. It is also the case that law is open to moral judgments. 
The problem with Dworkin’s theory is in considering that the deep disagreement over the concept 
of law can only be a consequence of its supposedly moralized core; and that central attribute 
should link legal analysis to a normative doctrine. Putnam offers an alternative way of thinking 
the theoretical divergence phenomenon.  
The biggest problem is that the category of interpretive concepts is more comprehensive 
than  Dworkin  seems  willing  to  admit.  For  example,  the  Hilary  Putnam’s  pragmatic  realism 
provides that, due to conceptual relativity, even the most fundamental truths can be disputed in 
the  way  Dworkin’s  moral  truths  are.  Conceptual  relativity  is  the  doctrine  in  which  a  given 
conceptual scheme can determine rigorously opposite statements to another alternative scheme, 
without them really being in opposition – in the sense that it is not possible to decide in a neutral 
nonpartisan  way,  which  of  these  is  the  most  adequate
16.  Dworkin  understands  that  the 
disagreement between two people over what is right or wrong could only be a sign of relativism 
according to a third person’s judgement, someone able to offer his own moral considerations
17.  
Basically, Dworkin believes that what is true or false can only be understood within the scope of 
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a certain theory; and this is exactly what Putnam’s pragmatic realism presents, not only for moral 
theory, but for every cognitive experience
18. 
Some recent developments in epistemology may suggest that “fact and value” dichotomy is 
not as clear as Dworkin argues. The evidence points to a different conception of the relationship 
between normative and descriptive ways of thinking, especially in science. Putnam has devoted 
much of his career to criticize the “fact and value” dichotomy. He is quite an eclectic philosopher 
and wrote on various subjects, including legal theory. His role in the present work is to raise 
doubts about the implications that Dworkin argues for the Hume’s principle.  
A constant concern in Putnam’s work is to find the place of fact in a world of values
19. 
Confronting  the  logical  positivists  for  their  attempts  of  asserting  the  criteria  of  rational 
justification in general – which should result in the formalization of the scientific method
20 – he 
intended to argue for other forms of knowledge, beside the natural sciences model
21. It means that 
the worldview provided by the natural sciences cannot exhaust the possibilities of meaning. 
There must be a broader sense of rationality, covering propositions for which there are no 
verification criteria
22. One of the remarkable  aspects of this broader sense of rationality is the 
existence of objective value judgments  – that is, that not merely reflect personal opinions. The 
very idea of scientific method is only possible if it is assumed that guiding action concepts
23, 
such as "simplicity" and "coherence", are objective
24. If the notion of coherence integrates the 
parameters under which it is determined whether a scientific theory is acceptable or not, one 
would assume that similar notions in other areas can help determine the accep tability of other 
theories, e.g. theories of morality. 
The broader conception of rationality should give rise to non-scientific forms of knowledge. 
Putnam shows that behind the whole objectivity notion, there are rational activities which are not 
governed by clear criteria. He refers to the fact that all factual judgment are permeable to value 
judgments.  His  examples  point  to  fundamental  notions  in  logic,  mathematics  and  science  in 
general
25. Value and normativity permeate the whole experience
26. As for moral   and ethical 
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values, there is no reason to distinguish the type of attitude that the interpretive sciences require 
from the judgments about them. It is not that they are not different, but they are all arguably 
objective. To very crudely summarize the argument, one can say that the idea of objectivity is not 
the  privilege  of  descriptive  propositions,  it  is  something  present  in  every  manifestation  of 
exercised reason
27. 
What is significant about this is that Putnam's conclusions are very similar to those of 
Dworkin  regarding  the  nature  of  moral  discourse,  and  yet  taking  completely  different 
assumptions, specifically about the characterization of argumentative practices of distinguishing 
between factual judgments and value judgments. Both advocate a kind of "ob jectivity without 
objects" for morality
28. Like Dworkin, Putnam frequently uses the idea of interpretation to 
portray the kind of intellectual activity that is not subject to test
29 and shows dismay over some 
philosophers’ recurrent attempts to adopt an Archimedean point
30. But the two authors obtain 
very  different  methodological  implications.  While  Dworkin  speaks  of  a  dualism  between 
interpretation and science in intellectual activity
31, Putnam speaks of conceptual relativity  – the 
idea  that  there  are  no  neutral  descriptions  for  some  fundamental  notions,  only  partisan 
characterizations,  and  that  some  disputes  are  caused  by  different  choice  of  means  of 
formalization or by different conceptual schemes
32. 
If Putnam is right, then the whole descriptive discourse is  subject to fundamental notions 
that are very similar to Dworkin’s interpretive concepts. In other words, descriptions are also 
founded in disagreements that have to be resolved in terms of evaluative reasoning
33, without 
assuming any ethical or moral implication. This means that different forms of describing reality 
can coexist – as theoretical disagreement or as conceptual relativity –, even if they are mutually 
incompatible, simply because the available conceptual schemes are not sufficiently complete so 
that the ambiguity is completely excluded
34. 
Back to the conceptual disagreements in law, the problem of the nature of law  can  be 
approached as a doctrinal construction that is internal to the legal discourse, but can also be seen 
from a strictly theoretical point of view. The first notion, which can be called “normative concept 
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of law”
35, is adequate to formulate a justification for a certain characterization of law. This is 
because, from the internal perspective of a participant in a legal system which is not simply a 
system of rules, what defines the correctness of a norm
36 – what distinguishes an acceptable norm 
from  a  “wrong”  norm
37  –  is  a  comprehensive  theory  that  accounts  for  the  law’s  finality. 
Basically, what Dworkin intends to build is a theory of law that is a special case of a theory of 
public morality
38. 
What the interpretivist can long for is to offer a conception of law that is adequate for the 
way the participants face the legal discourse in the scope of their specific legal systems. This 
approach is similar to positivism in the way that it tries to explain, although doctrinarily, how the 
legal  discourse  operates,  highlighting  its  underlying  elements
39.  Dworkin  fails  in  his 
characterization of the theorist’s job. He argues that law is endowed with a purpose and one can 
only understand it from the characterization of legal practices as the most satisfactory realization 
of this purpose. This task would be morally engaged, since it would be necessary to justify the 
law by stating its purpose. What Dworkin could not suppose is that every legal theorist agrees 
without reservation with this normative concept of law; his is not necessarily  the concept of 
law
40. 
So, considering the fact that jurisprudence does not impose an interpretive approach, one 
could accept that the knowledge of the concept of law is obtained in two different forms. If legal 
theory is seen as a science, instead of a doctrinal construction, it would create an intermediate 
level between the design of conceptual analysis proposed by Dworkin and the sciences that place 
themselves in a completely external perspective, like sociology of law, for instance. It dedicates 
itself to expose patterns of behavior more or less safe for the identification for the practice of 
law
41. Unlike normative theories, such as interpretivism, this science of law doesn’t position itself 
as  the  best  solution  for  legal  problems  –  it  is  neutral  –  and  doesn’t  depend  on  its  own 
characteristics from specific legal systems  – it is generic
42. It proposes a description of how 
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individuals are brought under regulatory control of a set of rules, as opposed to the empirical 
sciences that would provide explanations that exclude the participants’ mental states
43. 
Dworkin  rejects  this  intermediate  instance.  For  him,  a  theory  that  intends  to  take  into 
account the normative aspect of a social practice, must do so itself by normative commitments. 
This occurs because the values are linked to an integrated epistemology that unites them in one 
comprehensive theory
44, and by the interpretive character of the conception of value that impose 
the parameters of its own interpretive genre
45. But Dworkin fails to show what makes the law 
necessarily an interpretive concept. 
 
V. The nature of legal theory 
Dworkin argues that the “fact and value” dichotomy and the unity of value – central aspects in his 
new book – determine what the possible means of investigations are. What he fails to realize is 
that there isn’t an incompatibility between the normative character of the object and the moral 
neutrality of the explicative model. Any determination of an object of study involves valuation, 
and this does not mean that the appropriate theory has to be itself evaluative. The judgment made 
by theorists on the important and significant elements of a social practice do not necessarily refer 
to moral judgments, even though the participants themselves attribute moral meanings
46. What 
Dworkin meant by moral consequences of the theory of law, product of his unity of value 
argument, should be understood as a type of interpreti ve activity common to any other form of 
description. 
It has been said here that the methodological question against positivism is in the interpretive 
character of the notion of law. The possibility of a neutral theory of law bases itself on the fact 
that the interpretation of a concept – in the ordinary sense but not in Dworkin’s – entails its own 
explanation.  What is expected of someone who has understood a certain concept is that he is 
capable of explaining its main characteristics
47. It is true that, to determine which characteristics 
are really important for the understanding of the concept, some form of evaluation is essential
48.  
But the value judgment important here is not the same as the one Dworkin refers to. The 
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evaluation demanded by the determination of a concept’s essential features would be probably an 
epistemic one.  
For Brian Leiter, the normative concept of law can be accepted only if it is shown to be the 
best explanation for the concept that is commonly used. The only normative aspect involved in 
the explanation of the concept is the determination of which of its elements are essential and 
which  are  merely  accidental.  This  type  of  normativity  is  common  to  every  scientific 
investigation; it means the requirement of respect for epistemic values
49.  Every investigation 
demands some choices about how to systematize the available data, and in certain cases  – 
especially borderline cases – demands some kind of balancing
50. There is no reason to believe 
that the interpretive or discursive character of c ertain practice interferes in the methodological 
decisions necessary for every investigative project
51. Values such as simplicity and coherence in 
the context of epistemology are properties that each theory may or may not have
52. Thus, it is 
important to distinguish the values that orient the choice for the best legal proposition from the 
values that orient the choice for the best conception of law. 
Since Dworkin adopts a procedure for the attainment of the meaning of value terms, he 
should accept that this also works for such epistemic values. In legal theory, this means to say 
that there is no neutral pattern for the formulation of theoretical models. A theory that does not 
adopt a participant internal perspective cannot be immediately rejected, it can only be supplanted 
by  an  epistemologically  better  one  –  in  other  words,  one  that  reflects  better  the  best 
reconstruction of the legal theory, given some epistemic values. An inclusive positivism starts 
with the advantage of offering a conception of law that explains a larger numbers of situations – 
it is more consilient –, because it is not linked to a specific legal framework. 
In this argument presented by Leiter, Dworkin’s conception of law must be compared to the 
positivist  conceptions.  Interpretivism  is  at  a  frank  disadvantage  because  of  its  local 
characteristics. The interpretivist method is a theoretical choice based on the characteristics of a 
specific legal system, the American legal tradition. Thus, an important defect of this theory is that 
it is excessively parochial; it could be a good conception of American law, but fails in its attempt 
as a general conception of a concept of law
53. It should be possible to formulate a universal 
conception of law that establishes its meaning through a non -interpretive  procedure; hence, 
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rejecting Dworkin’s interpretive concept classification. According to Leiter, Dworkin writes as if 
the normative concept is the only concept of law, but what Dworkin should be trying to argue is 
that his normative concept of law is our concept of law. 
One last concern should take place. Leiter’s characterization of the dispute is inadequate 
because  it  considers  that  there  is  a  convergence  of  objectives  between  positivists  and 
interpretivists.  In his  characterization, every legal  theorist  is  engaged in the same enterprise. 
However, as Dworkin makes it very clear in his last book, his normative concept of law cannot be 
understood outside of a moral theory. One could say, according to Dworkin, a neutral explanation 
is inadequate not for ignoring nature of the concept that is effectively shared, but by rejecting a 
notion of obligation, at least from the point of view of his own moral theory
54. It could be said 
that the interpretivist model imposes itself as a moral obligation for every legal theorist. It is hard 
to understand exactly what that would mean, and it Dworkin certainly never intended to follow 
this train of thought.  
 
VI. Conclusions 
The debate between the two endeavors, the interpretivist one and the positivist one, appears to be 
confused. Each one seems to come from too different places to have any type of understanding. 
Hart, in his postscript to The Concept of Law, seems to have understood precisely this point. He 
rejects the suggestion that his project and that of Dworkin, “so different” from each other, could 
be in conflict
55. As a matter of fact, maybe they are not. Dworkin states that it is impossible to 
define a line between law and morals and the relation between them  –  one  of  the  greatest 
jurisprudential problems – without assuming the answer for the beginning. Either the question is 
approached from a legal point of view, from a theory of legal sources – that should adopt a 
descriptive,  morally  neutral  approach  from  the  reading  of  legal  texts  –  or  from  a  moral 
perspective,  resorting  to  a  justification  for  this  delimitation  –  which  is  nothing  more  than  a 
justification of the legal institutions
56. The positivist would rejoin that he operates on a different 
level, trying to describe how the participants perceive the relation between law and morality. This 
enterprise is neither legal, nor moral, but conceptual. All that is left for Dworkin is to appeal to 
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his concepts’ taxonomy
57, which is nothing more than a direct consequence of the assumption 
that the factual judgments are of a different nature from value judgments. 
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